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Abstract
The banking industry has been subject to extensive government regulation covering what prices
(that is, interest rates) they can charge, what activities they can engage in, what risks they can
and cannot take, what capital they must hold, and what locations they can operate in. This paper
summarizes the evolution of these regulations, with a focus on those put into place in the 1930s
and later removed in the last part of the 20
th century. We argue that regulatory change was driven
by technological, legal, and economic shocks that affected competition among different groups.
As we show, the role of both private interests and public interests play a key role in the analysis.
We also describe the consequences of banking regulation and deregulation for both the financial
services industry and the economy. The industry adapted to the regulatory constraints imposed in
the 1930s, thus partially reducing the costs of regulatory distortions. Nevertheless, banking
efficiency improved following deregulation, and this improvement generated substantial real
benefits for the economy as a whole.
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I.  Introduction
The banking industry has been subject to extensive government regulation covering what
prices (that is, interest rates) banks can charge, what activities they can engage in, what risks
they can and cannot take, what capital they must hold, and what locations they can operate in. 
Banks are subject to regulation by multiple regulators at both the state and federal level.  Each
state has its own regulatory commission.  At the federal level the primary bank regulators are the
Office of the Comptroller of the Currency (OCC), the Federal Deposit Insurance Corporation
(FDIC), and the Federal Reserve Board.  Even banks that operate at a single location are likely to
be regulated by at least one state and two federal bodies.
The banking industry also plays a significant part in both the financial system and the
economy as a whole.  The importance of the banking industry goes beyond its mere size;
numerous studies (as we describe below) have shown that the health of this sector has significant
effects on overall economic activity.  Banks (along with other financial institutions) encourage
and collect savings that finance economic growth.  By allocating that savings and monitoring the
use of those funds, banks play an integral role in assuring the productivity of resource use
throughout the economy.  Banks are also a crucial provider of liquidity to both individuals and
firms, and this role becomes particularly important in times of economic stress and crisis.  The
quality of bank regulation, which affects the stability, efficiency, and size of the sector, thus has
an important effect on the level and volatility of economic growth.
Regulation of banking has undergone tremendous change over time, with extensive
regulations put into place in the 1930s, and later removed in the last quarter of the 20
th century. 
This deregulation has been accompanied by a dramatic reduction in the number of banking
institutions in the United States but not an increase in banking concentration at the local level. 
Regulatory change has been driven by both macroeconomic shocks as well as competition
among interest groups within banking and between banks and other financial services providers. 
As we show, the role of both private interests and public interests play a key role in the analysis. 2
This paper focuses on the evolution and consequences of regulation for the banking industry in
the United States, and attempts to explain both their origins and reforms in recent years.
Our paper has four main goals.  First, we provide an overview of the major regulations
that have affected the structure and efficiency of the banking industry.  In Section II, we explain
the origins of state and federal banking regulation and briefly describe how the laws and
regulations have evolved.  We focus on five areas: restrictions on entry and geographic
expansion; deposit insurance; product-line and activity restrictions; pricing restrictions; and
capital regulation.
Second, we evaluate the consequences of these regulations for the banking industry as
well as for the financial system more broadly.  Glass-Steagall regulation, to take one example,
prevented commercial bank involvement in the corporate bond and equity underwriting
businesses until its recent repeal.  Glass-Steagall not only kept commercial banks from
competing with investment banks, but also spawned a variety of innovations and institutions
such as venture capital to substitute where banks could not go.  What we call “market
adaptation” to regulatory constraints has generated change in the banking and financial services
industry, as banks and their competitors attempt to circumvent the costs of regulations. 
Moreover, a regulation that at one point helped the industry, may later become a burden and
hence sow the seeds of its own demise.  Interest rate restrictions that eliminated price
competition among banks, for example, lost the support of the industry when new financial
institutions and markets emerged to provide market rates of interest on checking-like accounts
(e.g., the Merrill Lynch Cash Management Account from the 1970s).  The first half of Section III
provides a brief overview of such consequences, adaptations, and regulatory responses.
Third, we investigate the real effects of bank regulation, on both the industry and the
economy.  The elimination of geographic restrictions on bank expansion that limited
competition, for example, had very positive consequences on the industry (by reducing the
riskiness of banks and increasing their efficiency), on credit supply (by providing lower pricing3
of loans) and on the economy (by increasing economic growth and reducing economic
fluctuations).  Deregulation of restrictions on geographical expansion and product lines also has
led to a more consolidated but generally less locally concentrated banking system dominated by
larger and better diversified banking organizations that compete in multiple markets. 
Finally, we provide a positive explanation for regulatory change (Section IV).  A variety
of technological, legal and economic shocks have altered the relative strengths, effectiveness,
and interests of different groups competing for support or reform of banking regulation.  The
development of the automated teller machine (ATM) in the early 1970s, for example, reduced
the value of geographic protections to smaller local banks, thereby reducing their willingness to
fight to maintain restrictions on branching.  A number of court decisions also changed the impact
of long-standing regulations in areas such as usury ceilings.  Economic crises, either system wide
as in the 1930s or to parts of the financial system as in the Savings and Loan Crisis of the 1980s,
have also had important distributional impacts that led to regulatory change.  We provide some
explanations for both the timing of regulatory changes broadly, and for the patterns of change
across states, and we conclude with prospects for future regulatory change.
II.  Evolution of Key Dimensions of Bank Regulations
We begin by describing the historical origins and evolution of the most important
dimensions of banking regulation in the United States: restrictions on bank entry and geographic
expansion; deposit insurance; regulation of bank products; pricing restrictions; and capital
requirements.  Table 1 summarizes this history with the origins and evolution of the key
legislative and regulatory decisions.
1
[Insert Table 1 here]
A.  Historical Background: States and the Federal Government
As we discuss in more detail in the next section, the origin of the power of states in the
U.S. to regulate banking goes back to 1789.  The Constitution gave states the right to charter4
banks as well as to regulate their activities.  Alexander Hamilton, however, advocated the
creation of a federally-chartered bank to deal with debt from the Revolutionary War and to unify
the currency.  The First Bank of the United States was created in 1791 and operated until 1811. 
The accumulation of federal debt due to the War of 1812 then revived interest in a federal bank
and the Second Bank of the United States was chartered in 1816.  Farm interests and generally
interests outside of the northeast strongly opposed the Second Bank, arguing that it involved
excessive centralized control of the financial system, usurped states’ rights to charter banks,
inappropriately drew resources from around the country into the hands of wealthy members of
the northeast elite, and unfairly competed with state-chartered banks (see Bray Hammond 1957).  
Andrew Jackson built a coalition of anti-bank forces to win re-election in 1832 and vetoed the
re-chartering of the Second Bank.  During the 1830s and 1840s, a number of states passed “free
banking” statutes that encouraged entry of more banks.
2
This veto took the federal government out of banking and its regulation until the Civil
War, when a variety of Acts, including the National Banking Act of 1863, created a federal
charter for banks and initiated the so-called “dual” banking system of competing state and
federal regulation (see White 1983).  These newly created “national” banks were enticed to hold
federal government debt to back their issuance of bank notes, thereby helping to finance the
Civil War.  The Act also taxed the issuance of bank notes by state-chartered institutions, thereby
giving an incentive for banks to switch from state to federal charters.
In the nineteenth century, private clearinghouse systems developed to provide some
forms of private sector monitoring and “regulation” of bank activities.  Although there is much
controversy concerning the efficacy of the private clearinghouse system, the Panic of 1907 and
the inability of the New York clearinghouses to prevent the collapse of important parts of the
banking system again revived interest in federal involvement in banking.
3   The Federal Reserve
Act of 1913 created a federally-chartered central bank with important federal bank regulatory
powers and a system of regional Federal Reserve Banks.  This decentralized structure reflected5
the continuing struggle between the financial elites in the northeast and interests in the rest of the
country.
B.  Chartering restrictions and restrictions on geographic expansion
After the United States Constitution prevented the states from issuing fiat money and
from taxing interstate commerce, states used their powers over banks to generate a substantial
part of their revenues (Sylla, Legler, and Wallis 1987).  States received fees for granting bank
charters, and state governments often owned or purchased shares in banks and levied taxes on
banks.  During the first third of the nineteenth century, for example, the bank-related share of
total state revenues exceeded 10 percent in a dozen states.  In Massachusetts and Delaware, a
majority of total state revenue was bank-related.  
States used their regulatory authority over banks to enhance revenues coming from this
source.
4  In particular, each state had an interest in restricting competition among banks, and
many of the restrictions on the geographical expansion of banks originate in this period.  To
enter the banking business, one had to obtain a charter from the state legislature.  States received
no charter fees from banks incorporated in other states, so the states prohibited out-of-state banks
from operating in their territories—hence the origin of the prohibition on interstate banking.
In addition to excluding banks from other states, the legislatures often restricted intra-
state expansion.  States would grant a charter for a specific location or limit bank branches to
that city or county, but these restrictions would also typically protect the bank from intrusion by
branches of another bank.
5  By adopting branching restrictions, the states were able to create a
series of local monopolies from which they could extract at least part of the rents.  Some state
legislatures even passed “unit banking” laws that prevented a bank from having any branches.
Such regulations, naturally, produce beneficiaries who are loathe to give up their protections
and privileges.  Benefits tend to be concentrated, while costs to consumers of a less efficient and
competitive financial sector tend to be diffuse, as we describe more fully in the political-
economy section below (e.g., Stigler, 1971; Peltzman, 1976).6
The 1927 McFadden Act clarified the authority of the states over the regulation of
national bank’s branching activities within their borders.
6 Although there was some deregulation
of branching restrictions in the 1930s, most states continued to enforce these policies into the
1970s.  For example, only 12 states allowed unrestricted statewide branching in 1970.  Between
1970 and 1994, however, 38 states deregulated their restrictions on branching.  Reform of
restrictions on intrastate branching typically occurred in a two-step process.  First, states
permitted multi-bank holding companies (MBHCs) to convert subsidiary banks (existing or
acquired) into branches.  MBHCs could then expand geographically by acquiring banks and
converting them into branches.  Second, states began permitting de novo branching, whereby
banks could open new branches anywhere within state borders.  Figure 1 describes the timing of
intra-state branching deregulation across the states. 
[Insert Figure 1 here]
In addition to branching limitations within a state, until the 1980s states prohibited cross-
state ownership of banks.  Following passage of the McFadden Act, banks had begun
circumventing state branching restrictions by building multi-bank holding companies with
operations in many states.  The Douglas Amendment to the 1956 Bank Holding Company (BHC)
Act ended this practice by prohibiting a BHC from acquiring banks outside the state where it was
headquartered unless the target bank’s state permitted such acquisitions.  Since all states chose to
bar such transactions, the amendment effectively prevented interstate banking.  
The first step toward change began in 1978, when Maine passed a law allowing entry by
out-of-state BHCs if, in return, banks from Maine were allowed to enter those states.  (Entry in
this case means the ability to purchase existing banks, not to enter de novo.)  No state
reciprocated, however, so the interstate deregulation process remained stalled until 1982, when
Alaska and New York passed laws similar to Maine’s.  State deregulation of interstate banking
was nearly complete by 1992, by which time all states but Hawaii had passed similar laws.  The
transition to full interstate banking was completed with passage of the Reigle-Neal Interstate7
Banking and Branching Efficiency Act of 1994, which effectively permitted banks and holding
companies to enter another state without permission (see Kroszner and Strahan 2000).
C.  Deposit Insurance
Federal deposit insurance in the United States dates back to 1933, when Congress passed
a series of laws designed to restore confidence in the financial and banking systems.  Early
debate over deposit insurance illustrates a clear understanding of the idea that while insurance
could reduce bank runs and the associated disruptions to bank-loan supply, the cost of deposit
insurance could be greater risk taking by banks (see, e.g., Kroszner and Melick 2005).  This
understanding reflected the experiences of earlier state-sponsored insurance and guarantee
regimes during the 19
th and early 20
th Century.  Half of the state-run bank note insurance systems
set up before the Civil War were at times unable to meet their obligations.  Later, eight states
created deposit insurance systems between 1907 and 1917, and all eight systems failed during
the 1920s due to excessive risk taking by banks in those states (Calomiris and White, 2000).  
The legislation creating the federal deposit insurance in the Great Depression itself was initially
opposed by the Roosevelt administration and many of the major Congressional leaders. 
Calomiris and White argue that federal insurance was ultimately adopted only because the
general public, concerned about bank safety following the banking collapse in the early 1930s,
became aligned with small and rural banks, the traditional supporters and  main beneficiaries of
deposit insurance.
Historical evidence suggests an important interaction between branching restrictions
described above and the riskiness of banks, namely that branch banking lowered risk and 
increased stability, thereby reducing the call for deposit insurance.  Gorton (1996) offers some
unique evidence that markets understood the stabilizing effect of branch banking.  He shows that
during the 19
th Century when private banks issued currency, notes in circulation that were issued
by new banks from branch banking states were discounted substantially less than notes issued by
banks from unit banking states.  Calomiris (1993) shows that both bank reserves and bank capital8
were lower in states with branch banking.  He also studies bank failure rates in three states
allowing branching but affected by the agricultural bust of the 1920s - Arizona, Mississippi and
South Carolina.  Failure rates in these three states were much lower for banks with branches than
those without.  Comparing states that allowed branching with those that limited it, Calomiris
(1992) also finds faster asset growth during the agricultural recession of the 1920s in states that
allowed branching.  And, as is widely recognized, the Canadian banking system, which
contained a small number of large banks with nationwide branching, experienced no bank
failures during the 1930s.
7
Both political debate as well as some limited evidence from roll call voting patterns
leading up to deposit insurance passage indicate that small and rural banks supported both
restrictions on bank branching (to reduce competitive pressure from large banks) and deposit
insurance (to increase deposit supply).  In contrast, large and urban banks pushed for branch
banking to allow them to compete with small banks directly, and generally opposed deposit
insurance as a subsidy to small, poorly diversified banks.  Calomiris and White (2000) compare
bank characteristics in states with relatively high support for a federal insurance bill brought to a
vote in 1913 (H.R. 7837).  They show that banks were smaller (particularly state banks) and
branching was less prevalent in states with high support. 
Small banks won the political battle in the 1930s, and continued to win subsequent
battles over the next several decades.  Deposit insurance coverage was increased in 1950 (from
$5,000 to $10,000), in 1966 (to $15,000), in 1969 (to $20,000), in 1974 (to $40,000) and in 1980
with passage of DIDMCA (to $100,000).  White (1998) argues that small banks supported each
of these increases, while large banks opposed them.  As a result, the real value of deposit
insurance rose from $5,000 (1934$s) initially to $10,000-$15,000 during the 1970s.  Since 1980,
deposit insurance coverage has remained flat, with inflation eroding its real value by about 50
percent over the past 25 years.  Deposit insurance has also been expanding globally (Demirguc-
Kunt and Kane, 2002).  Similar political forces seem to explain coverage levels across countries. 9
For example, Laeven (2004) shows that coverage levels are higher in countries with weaker and
riskier banking systems.
The large number of bank and thrift failures during the 1980s and early 1990s halted the
increasing coverage of deposit insurance in the U.S. (see Figure 2).  During the 1980s, to take
the most extreme example, the federal insurer of thrift deposits (the Federal Savings and Loan
Insurance Association (FSLIC)) itself became insolvent.  The S&L crisis had its roots in the
basic lack of diversification of thrift assets (long-term mortgages financed with short-term
deposits), coupled with regulators’ failure to close market-value insolvent thrifts after the run-up
of interest rates in the early 1980s.  FSLIC was dismantled in 1989 when the Financial
Institutions Reform, Recovery and Enforcement Act (FIRREA) both recapitalized the Savings
Association Insurance Fund (SAIF) and gave the FDIC responsibility for overseeing deposit
insurance for thrifts.
8  
[Insert Figure 2 here]
This very costly experience with deposit insurance led to reform in the early 1990s.  The
FDIC Improvement Act (FDICIA) of 1991 attempts to reduce the risk-taking incentives inherent
in deposit insurance by introducing risk-based premiums and by directing the FDIC to resolve
failed banks in the least costly way to the deposit insurance fund.  The deposit insurance premia
were required to generate sufficient revenue to reach a target ratio of 1.25 percent of deposits
insured by the fund.  The motivation behind the  least-cost resolution provisions were the failure
of large banks such as Continental Illinois and Bank of New England during the 1980s in which
all creditors had been bailed out to avoid ‘systemic’ disruptions.  The Comptroller of the
Currency even announced publicly after Continental Illinois that some large banks were ‘too big
to fail’.
9  This public announcement was quickly seen as unwise, and the 1991 law attempted to
correct market perceptions that some banks were too big to fail and thereby reign in excessive
risk taking incentives.  Importantly, FDICIA also introduced “prompt corrective action” whereby
regulators are required to respond swiftly and not exercise “forbearance” as institutions fall into10
trouble.
10 
In recent years, the tide has turned again, toward expansion of deposit insurance.  In
2002, small banks began issuing fully insured certificates of deposit through the Certificates of
Deposit Account Registry Service (CDARS).  CDARS works through a network of banks
whereby a customer’s large deposits are split up and placed as accounts under the $100,000
deposit insurance limit at bank members of the system.  Thus, large depositors can effectively
get around deposit insurance limits.  At the same time, pressure for extended de jure coverage
seems to be coming from small banks.  For example, the Independent Community Bankers
Association, “has been in the forefront of the campaign for comprehensive Federal deposit
insurance reform including automatic inflation adjustments of coverage levels.  In the 24 years
since FDIC coverage was last adjusted, inflation has eroded away more than half its value.  The
stability of our financial system depends on consumer confidence that their funds will be
protected.  We are working with key Members of Congress to make comprehensive deposit
insurance reform with automatic inflation adjustments a reality.”
11
At the same time, bank deposit growth has pushed the Bank Insurance Fund to near the
1.25 percent reserve threshold, potentially triggering assessments for deposit insurance for even
highly rated institutions.  The prospect of these assessments, along with small-bank advocacy of
increasing deposit insurance coverage, led to the passage of the Federal Deposit Insurance
Reform Act of 2005.  The Act is part of the Deficit Reduction Act of 2005 (S 1932) that was
signed into law on February 8, 2006.  The Act creates a new Deposit Insurance Fund (DIF) that
merges the old Bank Insurance Fund with the Savings Institution Insurance Fund, increases
deposit insurance for retirement accounts to $250,000, provides for the adjustment of deposit
insurance limits for inflation beginning in April 2010, and, perhaps most importantly, increases
the FDIC’s flexibility in setting risk-based premiums.  Constraints on risk-based premiums
remain, however, because once the new DIF reserve fund reaches 1.35 percent of total insured
deposits, dividends must be paid to member institutions so that the reserve ratio does not exceed11
this threshold.  
D.  Product-Line Restrictions
Explicit restrictions prohibiting bank involvement in underwriting, insurance and other
“non-bank” financial activities began with passage of the Banking Act of 1933.  The four
sections of the Act that separate banking and non-banking activity—16, 20, 21, 32—are
collectively known as the “Glass-Steagall Act” (Mester 1996).  The Bank Holding Company Act
of 1956 (and the Amendment to the Act in 1970) further strengthened the demarcation between
banks, insurance, and securities firms.  It was not until the mid-1980s that the Federal Reserve
and the Office of the Comptroller of Currency (OCC) began loosening restrictions on bank
participation in investment banking and insurance. 
Even though concerns about the stability of the banking system would be a rationale for
the continuation of the Glass-Steagall separations subsequently, such considerations did not form
an important part of the debate in 1933.  Banks that were involved in underwriting securities
tended to be larger and better diversified than other banks and were less likely to fail during the
1930s (see White 1987).  Instead, the main focus of the debate on bank powers concerned
conflicts of interest.  With their close relationships with firms, bankers might have an
information advantage relative to the market about the prospects for a firm.  If a bank knows that
a firm may be heading for distress before the market does, a bank that succumbs to conflicts
would issue a security to the public and have the firm use the proceeds to repay its loans to the
bank.  A number studies of bank underwriting behavior during the 1920s and 1930s, however,
have found little evidence to suggest that such conflicts were important in practice (see Kroszner
and Rajan 1994 and 1997, Ang and Richardson 1995, Puri 1995, and  Kroszner 1998).
12
Although Glass-Steagall and the subsequent Banking Acts of 1956 and 1970 disallowed
underwriting by banks and bank holding company (BHC) affiliates, certain securities, deemed
‘eligible’ securities by regulators, were exempted from the original Act, and were therefore
never in question by regulators.  These eligible securities included municipal general obligation12
bonds, U.S. government bonds, and real estate bonds (Kwan 1998).  
The Federal Reserve began the expansion of BHC powers with a decision in 1987 to
allow subsidiaries of three BHCs to underwrite certain previously prohibited securities on a
limited basis.
13  The Federal Reserve derived legal authority for the decision from a clause in
Section 20 of the 1933 Banking Act that prohibits banks from affiliating with a company
‘engaged principally’ in underwriting or dealing securities (Mester 1996).  On April 30, 1987,
the Federal Reserve argued that the ‘engaged principally’ clause allowed BHC subsidiaries to
underwrite certain ‘ineligible securities’ such as municipal revenue bonds, commercial paper,
and mortgage-related securities as long as the revenue from such underwriting did not exceed 5
percent of the subsidiary’s gross revenue (Bhargava and Fraser 1998).    
On January 18, 1989, the Federal Reserve allowed the ‘Section 20 subsidiaries’ to
underwrite corporate debt and equity securities contingent on the 5 percent revenue limitation. 
The Federal Reserve continued its incremental lifting of restrictions by increasing the revenue
limit on Section 20 subsidiaries to 10 percent on September 13, 1989 and to 25 percent on
December 20, 1996 (Bhargava and Fraser 1998, Ely and Robinson 1999).  To relax this revenue
restriction further, banks also placed other activities, such as those related to government
securities, in these subsidiaries.
Throughout the debate on BHC involvement in non-bank financial operations, the
Federal Reserve enforced firewalls between banking and non-banking activity within the
subsidiary structure of the BHC.  These firewalls were instituted to prevent financial and
information flows between securities and banking subsidiaries, and to insulate banking activity
from unforeseen shocks to non-bank activity (Shull and White, 1998).  For example, bank
lending to non-bank subsidiaries was limited, and restrictions were placed on payments from
banks to the holding company (Boyd and Graham, 1986).  Beginning in July of 1996, the Federal
Reserve began loosening the barriers between banking and non-banking activities.  Interestingly,
similar firewalls had emerged endogenously during the 1920s as investment companies affiliated13
with banks sought to commit credibly to markets not to abuse private information from lending
relationships (Kroszner and Rajan, 1997).
While the Federal Reserve oversaw BHC expansion into securities, OCC rulings backed
by the federal courts simultaneously loosened restrictions on national banks’ insurance activity.
These regulatory changes allowed BHCs to make some inroads into non-banking financial
services.  Lown, Osler, Strahan and Sufi (2000) show, for example, that BHCs’ percentage of the
securities industry’s aggregate revenue went from 9 percent in 1993 to over 25 percent in 1999. 
Bhargava and Fraser (1998) report similar findings, and show that bank underwriting activities
broadened considerably and included a full range of debt and equity issues.  Lown, et al (2000)
also show that BHCs greatly expanded annuity sales after the 1995 Supreme Court decision
(Nationsbank v. VALIC) ruling that states could not prohibit the sales of annuities by national
banks (which we describe in more detail in section IV).  Although BHCs were exploring the
insurance sales sector, the authors show that BHC involvement in the insurance market remained
small, in part because strict barriers between insurance underwriting remained a significant
impediment to the joint production of cross-sector financial services.
Congress finally completed the dismantling of Glass-Steagall altogether by passing the
Financial Modernization Act  in 1999, which allows Financial Holding Companies (FHCs) to
own affiliates engaged in banking, insurance underwriting and securities activities.  The Act,
known also the Gramm-Leach-Bliley Act or “GLBA,” was passed a little more than six months
following the merger of Citicorp and Travelers, which formed the first full-service financial
conglomerate in the United States since the 1920s.  
While the newly formed Citigroup has subsequently divested much of its insurance
holdings, the lines between commercial and investment banking have become increasingly
blurred during the past five years.  As Figure 3 shows, for example, financial conglomerates
have come to dominate the market for debt underwriting (see Sufi (2005)).  In 1996, the top five
debt underwriters were all stand-alone investment banks (Morgan Stanley, Salomon Brothers,14
Goldman Sachs, Merrill Lynch and First Boston).  By 2003, however, four of the top five
underwriters were owned by full-service financial conglomerates (Citigroup, JPMorganChase,
Bank of America, Merrill Lynch and Credit Suisse).  At the same time, traditional investment
banks have made inroads into commercial lending.  According to Loan Pricing Corporation, for
example, Goldman Sachs ranked seventh and Lehman Brothers ranked ninth in arranging
syndicated loans during the first half of 2005.
14
[Insert Figure 3 here]
This convergence offers a striking parallel between recent times and the 1920s,
particularly with respect to pressures on commercial banks to become more involved in the
corporate securities markets (Kroszner 1998).  One of the most notable developments then was
the increasing frequency with which firms accessed the public equity and debt markets.  The
volume of new equity issues grew during the 1920s, skyrocketing in late 1928 and 1929.  The
1980s also was a period that witnessed a dramatic increase in the number of the initial public
offerings (IPOs).  The number of IPOs nearly tripled from the 1970s to the 1980s, from an
average of 120 per year to an average of 350 per year (Loughran and Ritter, 1994).
More firms also were beginning to use bond financing in both periods.  Smaller and
lesser known firms were enjoying new access to the bond markets in both the 1920s and 1980s. 
With the entrance of a new class of firms, the average rating of corporate bonds declined.  The
proportion of bonds that were initially rated below investment grade rose steadily during the
1920s, from 12 percent in 1921 to 43 percent by 1929 (Kroszner and Rajan, 1994).  The same
phenomenon occurs during the 1980s with the growth of original issue high yield debt (so-called
junk bond) market.  The number of initially rated below investment grade bonds grows from 24
in 1981 to 200 by 1986, and the amount issued rises from $1.2 billion to $30.9 billion during this
period (Asquith et al. 1989).
15
With the growth of the public markets as a source of funds for firms came a
corresponding decline in reliance on commercial bank borrowing.  In addition, banks were15
facing greater competition from other financial institutions.  As Table 2 illustrates, commercial
bank share of the total assets of U.S. financial institutions had held steady at 60 to 65 percent
from 1880 to 1922.  Commercial banks then experienced a sharp decline in share between 1922
and 1929 to 54 percent, while investment companies (i.e., mutual funds), securities brokers and
dealers, finance companies, and insurance companies grew in share.
16  Between 1980 and 2004,
commercial banks again saw a sharp drop in their share, which had held relatively steady
between 1960 and 1980 at between 35 and 38 percent, to 24 percent by 2004.
[Insert Table 2 here]
One additional comparison and contrast between the economic and financial conditions
of the 1920s and 1980s is of note (see Kroszner 1998).
17  Both decades began and ended with
recessions and had a lengthy period of economic growth in between.  The recession at the
beginning of the 1920s, like the one at the beginning of the 1980s, was sharp and short-lived. 
Both periods witnessed a major stock market crash (October 1929 and October 1987) toward the
end of each period.  The economic downturns that ended each decade were decidedly different  -
- one was the start of the Great Depression whereas the other was quite mild.  Both cases,
however, were accompanied by a major wave of depository institution failure and closure.  The
banking problems in the Great Depression were system-wide and led to a near collapse of the
entire financial system (see e.g., Friedman and Schwartz 1963; Calomiris and Mason, 2003),
whereas the troubles in the thrift and banking industries in the 1980s and early 1990s, while
considerable, did not have the same consequences (see, e.g., Barth 1991, Kane 1989, Kroszner
and Strahan 1996, and White 1991).
The difference in the severity of the end-of-decade downturns and banking problems can
account for at least part of the sharp contrast in the bank regulatory response in 1933 compared
to the opposing deregulatory response that began in the 1990s (discussed in Section IV below). 
In the early period, Congress began seriously to debate the restriction of bank powers soon after
the stock market crash.  Three years later, these restrictions were enacted in the first hundred-day16
wave of New Deal legislation as part of a broad bill to reform the banking system, including the
creation of federal deposit insurance.
E.  Restrictions on Pricing
Regulations have historically constrained pricing of both bank deposits and bank loans.
Ceilings on bank deposit interest rates, for example, were in effect into the early 1980s under the
Federal Reserve’s Regulation Q.  During periods when market interest rates rose above these
ceilings, banks and other depositories faced reduced deposit supply, forcing them to cut back on
lending.  This disintermediation became acute during the 1970s as market rates soared in
response to high inflation and loose monetary policy.  Moreover, the costs of holding non-
interest bearing required reserves at bank members of the Federal Reserve System rose sharply
with inflation.  In response to the plight of banks (as described more in the political economy
section below), Congress passed the Depository Institutions Deregulation and Monetary Control
Act (DIDMCA) in 1980, which lowered reserve requirements and gradually phased out most
deposit rate ceilings.  DIDMCA substantially leveled the competitive playing field across
depository institutions by imposing uniform reserve requirements and access to Federal Reserve
services, and by allowing banks to pay interest on NOW accounts nationwide (checkable
deposits).
On the lending side, usury laws restricting the rates banks may charge date back to the
Colonial period in the United States and have a very long history before that (e.g., Ellis, 1998;
Glaeser and Scheinkmann, 1998). Conventional interpretation of these laws is that they exist to
protect politically powerful borrowers.  Consistent with this view, Benmelech and Moskowitz
(2005) find states with more powerful incumbent elites tended to have tighter usury restrictions
and responded less to external pressure for repeal.  In contrast, Glaeser and Scheinkmann (1998)
argue that the pervasiveness of usury restrictions across the world, as well as their persistence
over time, implies that such laws exist to reduce the impact of incomplete credit markets.  In
their model, agents borrow to smooth consumption in the face of negative income shocks, and17
usury laws transfer wealth to such low-income states, thus moving toward optimal risk sharing.
The importance of state usury laws was permanently reduced in 1978 when the Supreme
Court undermined states’ ability to enforce them in the Marquette National Bank v. First Omaha
Service case.  The court ruled that Section 85 of the National Banking Act allowed a lender to
charge up to the maximum amount allowed in its home state, regardless of the location of the
borrower.  Because credit card lending is not geographically based (in contrast to small business
lending), this decision created an incentive for states to raise their usury limits to compete for
banks.  In fact, Delaware and South Dakota eliminated them entirely, leading to rapid entry of
credit card banks in those two states.  By 1988, 18 states had removed interest rate ceilings, and
the supply of credit card loans expanded rapidly over the subsequent 20 years.  This increase in
supply was concentrated most among high-risk borrowers because the interest rate ceilings
restrict credit most among that segment of the market.  As a consequence, personal bankruptcy
rates began a long and steady increase, starting in 1978 with the Marquette decision (see Figure
in Ellis, 1998).
18   
DIDMCA of 1980 also relaxed some constraints on usury ceilings.  Although state usury
ceilings continue to be in place in most states, they are generally not indexed to inflation, so in
the recent low inflation environment they have not been binding on traditional bank lending.  For
“sub-prime” borrowers who may be riskier, however, the ceilings may still bind in some
circumstances.  Credit to sub-prime borrowers from alternative financial institutions, such as
pawn shops and payday loan companies, also are subject to interest rate ceilings.  Payday
lenders, which provide small-value short-term loans (typically under $300 for roughly two-
weeks), typically charge annualized interest rates that are at the state level maximum (see
Flannery and Samolyk, 2005). 
F.  Regulation of Bank Capital
Regulations designed to ensure sufficient capital in the banking industry date to the 19
th
century.  The grant of a bank charter typically came with a requirement for a minimum absolute18
amount of capital.  Regulations of bank capital-asset ratios did not emerge until the 1980s,
however, after  capital ratios in the banking industry had reached historical lows.  In fact,
leverage ratios in the U.S. banking system increased gradually but consistently starting in the
19
th century until the early 1980s.  Part of the increase in leverage is due to the introduction of
deposit insurance during the Great Depression, but part is likely to due increased bank size and
diversification, as well as better risk management practices that evolved over time (see Peltzman
1970 and Calomiris and Wilson 1996).
In the past two decades, regulations dictating minimum capital-asset ratios (maximum
leverage ratios) have become increasingly complex and comprehensive.  Banks first faced
minimum requirements based on the raw ratio of equity capital to total assets.  These regulations,
however, were quickly seen as inadequate as a greater share of bank business was associated
with off-balance sheet activities such as credit guarantees and unfunded loan commitments
(Boyd and Gertler, 1994).  These off-balance sheet activities came with a sharp increase in bank
revenues from non-interest sources (Mishkin and Strahan, 2000), and also represented an
important component of bank risk that was not measured at all by total assets or loans.  The 1988
Basel Capital Accord addresses this changing nature of banking (or bank accounting) by
including off balance sheet exposures and by accounting for credit risk in constructing risk-based
assets.  Under the simple scheme, loans with different risks face different marginal capital
requirements.  For example, banks had to fund business loans with at least eight percent capital,
whereas residential mortgages could be funded with only four percent capital.  The 1988 Accord
also addressed perceived inequities in capital requirements across countries, and attempted to
level the competitive playing field for internationally active banks.
During the past decade, banks have adopted increasingly sophisticated risk management
models, and these new financial technologies have spurred changes to capital requirements.  For
example, new capital requirements for market risks were adopted using banks’ internal risk
measurement models in 1996.  The key innovation leading to the regulatory change was the19
introduction of Value-at-Risk models (e.g. JP Morgan’s RiskMetrics model), which estimate
quantiles of profit and loss distributions for bank trading positions.  These models are useful
because they quantify the likely magnitude of bank losses during ‘normal’ market conditions
such as conditions covering 99% of trading days, and sophisticated versions of such models can
avoid making strong distributional assumptions (Jorion, 2000).
Following the successful introduction of market risk capital requirements, international
bank regulators began to negotiate a more complex and comprehensive capital regime.  Referred
to as Basel II, this new Accord has three “pillars” that focus on trying to update capital
requirements, ensure effective regulatory supervision, and enhance the role of market discipline
(see Bank for International Settlements, 2005).  The simple risk adjustment approach in the
original Accord was seen as no longer adequate to deal with market developments.
As with both the 1988 Accord and the 1996 Market Risk Amendment, the move to
update the capital requirements has been driven by advances in financial technology.  For
example, innovations such as securitization and credit derivatives in the late 1990s have made it
easier for banks to trade risk, but such trading allows banks to undermine the simple
measurement of asset risk behind the 1988 Accord (e.g. Calomiris and Mason, 2004).  At the
same time, credit risk measurement tools similar to those used for market risk have become
increasingly available.  Thus, the capital required under Basel II will depend on model-based
construction of the main dimensions of risk (market, operational and credit risks), and the system
is designed to encourage banks to develop internal models rather than rely on externally imposed
supervisory models.  In the US, the new Accord is likely to apply to only the largest banks that
compete internationally and the minimum leverage ratio (which does not involve risk adjustment
of the assets) from the original Accord will still apply.  In addition, revisions to the original
Accord are being undertaken to improve risk-adjustment for banks that will not be subject to
Basel II.  Both Basel II and the revisions of the original Accord are not yet final and will be
phased in over time.  20
It is important to recognize that capital regulations not only respond to changes in
financial technology but may also spur such innovations.  For example, efforts to avoid capital
may in part explain the rise in off balance sheet banking during the 1980s.  Similarly, the 1988
Accord may have encouraged banks to securitize loans in order to reduced required capital
ratios, and to trade risks via products such as credit default swaps.
III.  Consequences of Regulation and Deregulation
This section describes the consequences of banking regulations for the financial industry
and for the economy.  Much of our understanding of these effects comes from research
examining how the banking system evolves following regulatory changes, which are
concentrated in the period of regulatory tightening during the early 1930s, and the de-regulatory
period of the 1980s and 1990s.  As we describe, the increased regulations of banking and the
securities markets in the 1930s was followed by a decline in securities markets.  Later, “market
adaptation” generated alternative and less tightly regulated financial institutions to get around
regulatory constraints and provide services to investors that had previously been rendered by
banks.  
The experience of the last two decades has reversed the process.  Regulations on banks
and markets have eased, and this deregulation has occurred in part in response to the emergence
of competing financial institutions during the earlier period.  Despite market adaption that likely
mitigated the costs of the 1930s regulations, the recent wave of deregulation was followed by
substantial restructuring of banking leading to greater efficiency, improved credit access and
better economic performance.
A.  Consequences of “Market Adaption” after Glass-Steagall: Rise of Alternative Institutions
A.1 Decline of Securities Markets
The Glass-Steagall Act of 1933 effectively precluded banks from underwriting corporate21
securities (see Macey and Miller 1992), but for almost two decades after its enactment, the
securities markets saw much less activity than in the 1920s.  Almost no corporate securities were
issued between 1932 and 1935, even though the industrial production was rebounding strongly
from the depths of 1932.  Although the economy was recovering, output was still below its 1928
peak so there may not have been much desire on the part of firms to issue securities to finance
operations.  Alternatively, the removal of the commercial banks from underwriting and the new
federal regulation of securities market through the Securities Acts of the 1930s could have
increased the cost of securities issuances to prohibitive levels.
Even after the public issuance market revives a bit by the late 1930s, total issuance
remained below the levels following World War I.  During the 1930s and much of the 1940s,
however, there was an enormous increase in government bond issuance.  The growth of this
market was favorable to commercial banks because they played a major role in this market.  As
shown in Table 2, from the late 1930s to the late 1940s, commercial banks actually increased
their share of total assets held by financial institutions.  By the early 1950s, the corporate
securities markets were once again reviving and beginning to pose more of a challenge to bank
lending.  This situation led some bankers to attempt to avoid the Glass-Steagall prohibitions and
reenter the securities markets through a holding company structure.  The Bank Holding
Company Act of 1956, and its subsequent amendments in 1966 and 1970, thwarted this
movement by effectively extending the Glass-Steagall restrictions on banks to holding
companies which had banking subsidiaries (see Blair 1994).
A.2 Market Adaptation: The Growth of Alternative Financial Institutions
Until the 1980s, as noted above, U.S. commercial banks were effectively prohibited from
universal banking following the 1930s legislation.  This situation contrasts sharply with
Germany, and to some extent Japan, where banks are able to play a much more central role in the
financing of private enterprise (see Edwards and Fischer 1994 and Aoki et al. 1994). 
Interestingly, a variety of other financial organizations have arisen in the U.S. that can be22
interpreted as means of filling the gap that is the legacy of Glass-Steagall.  The organizations
discussed below are much more developed in the U.S. than in other countries, perhaps stimulated
by Glass-Steagall.  If we are to look for the silver lining in the cloud of Glass-Steagall, the richer
variety of alternative sources of funds for enterprise that the U.S. has relative to other countries
could be it.
As Table 2 illustrates, there are a number of important financial actors in the U.S. besides
commercial banks.
19  Pension funds, insurance companies, and investment companies (i.e., open
and closed end mutual funds), for example, have come to control large shares of the total assets
in financial institutions in the U.S.  Firms therefore have a rich variety of funding sources.  Each
set of financial institutions has a distinct set of regulations and a distinct set of interests.  These
institutions compete to influence financial legislation and regulation (see Kroszner and
Stratmann 1998 and 2000), and the regulatory agencies themselves may compete to increase
their domains of influence (see Kane 1988).  Expanding banking powers in such an environment
is unlikely to cause one group to capture all of the financial regulators and use them to impede
competition.  
In the post-WWII era, a variety of alternative organizations and contractual structures
have arisen in the U.S. which, at least in part, substitute for a universal bank.
20  Perhaps the
alternative which has been able to come closest is the venture capital (VC) organization.  The
first modern VC organization dates back to 1946 when a group of Boston investors formed
American Research and Development to invest in firms adapting war-related technological
innovations for commercial use (Gompers 1994 and Gompers and Lerner 1995). 
The VC industry, however, did not begin to grow rapidly until the late 1970s.  In 1979,
the "prudent expert" standard which governs permissible investments for pension funds was
broadened to allow pension funds to invest in VC funds.
21  This change was extremely important
since the regulations associated with ERISA discourage pension funds from directly becoming
"active investors," that is, investors who participate in both the financing and management of an23
enterprise (see Roe 1994).   Following the change in the "prudent expert" standard, annual
investment in VC funds grew substantially.
The VC form has been a method for pension fund managers and other fund managers to
pool their resources in VC funds and act indirectly as active investors.  VC funds typically
provide not only equity and debt financing but also management expertise and strategic
consulting, activities that regulations and tax incentives strongly discourage the pension funds
and investment companies themselves from doing (Roe 1994).  The VC industry has helped to
finance numerous start-up firms that then go public so it has an important effect on the growth of
the IPO market.
Another closely related form, the leveraged-buy-out organization (LBO) also has had a
large impact on corporation finance and restructuring, especially during the 1980s (see Jensen
1989 and Kaplan 1989).  Much like VC, LBO organizations take debt and equity stakes in firms
and become active in the management of the firm.  Unlike VC, they purchase existing firms or
divisions of firms, typically by using debt to purchase equity, thereby increasing the financial
leverage of the enterprise.  LBOs involving the purchase of public companies rose from 16 in
1979 to a peak of 125 in 1988, and the annual dollar volume grew from $65 million to nearly
$500 million (see Jensen 1989).  Jensen (1989) has argued that LBOs are effectively a form of
universal banking that is an "end-run" around Glass-Steagall.  Starting in the late 1990s, hedge
funds have also emerged as an important pool of (unregulated) capital invested in private equity.
B.  Real Impact of Recent Financial Deregulation
B.1 The Structure of the Banking Industry
Deregulation of restrictions on geographical expansion and product lines has led to a
more consolidated but less locally concentrated banking system dominated by larger and better
diversified banking organizations that compete in multiple markets.  Relaxation of restrictions on
bank expansion during the 1980s (removal of branching and interstate banking restrictions) led
to larger banks operating across wider geographical areas.  The effects of this deregulation on24
industry structure can be seen graphically in the next few Figures.  
The number of institutions, which remained almost constant for half a century, begins to
fall dramatically starting in the early 1980s, just as states began to dismantle restrictions on
geographic expansion (Figure 4).  The reduction in the number of banks occurs primarily
through merger.  As Figure 5 shows, the rate of bank mergers rises consistently from roughly
1980 until the end of the 1990s.  This decline of more than 40 percent in the number of banks
reflects an industry restructuring made possible by deregulation, rather than removal of “excess”
banking capacity.  In fact, as Figure 4 illustrates, the number of bank offices increases steadily
throughout the 1980s and 1990s – rising by more than one-third – despite the consolidation. 
Morever, the rate of de novo banking (new charters) is high on average during the 1980s and
1990s (Figure 5).
[Insert Figures 4 & 5 here]
The number of savings institutions also shrinks over this period (see Figure 4), but the
decline occurs mainly in response to the S&L Crisis.  During the second half of the 1980s the
annual failure rate for savings institutions reaches almost 10 percent of institutions per year
(recall Figure 2).  Following this decline, the banking industry began purchasing large numbers
of branches from failed savings institutions and began holding more residential mortgages. 
Moreover, during the 1990s, the government-sponsored enterprises (GSEs) -- The Federal
National Mortgage Association (Fannie Mae) and the Federal Home Loan Mortgage Corporation
(Freddie Mac) -- began to play an increasingly important role in holding and securitizing
mortgages, as shown in Figure 6.  In 1985, for example, about 25 percent of the outstanding
mortgages were either purchased and held or purchased and securitized by the GSEs.  By 2003,
this market share had increased to about 50 percent.
22
[Insert Figure 6 here]
Following passage of the Riegle-Neal Interstate Banking and Branching Act in 1994, the
U.S. banking system has been transformed from “balkanized” one in which institutions operated25
locally or within a state to a system that is nationally integrated.  This integration is primarily a
result of the emergence of multi-state banking organizations that can take advantage of operating
branches across state lines. Figure 7 illustrates this transformation.  The number of multi-state
banks rises from only 10 in 1994 to 387 in 2005.  Over this period, the number of branches in
interstate organizations rises from 328 to more than 28,000, which now comprise almost 40
percent of all banking offices. 
[Insert Figure 7 here]
Because the consolidation of the system involved national integration, the dramatic
reduction in the number of banks did not increase local banking-market concentration or market
power.  Restrictions on branching and interstate banking generally did not constrain banks’
ability to expand within local markets, with the exception of the unit banking states.  Thus,
deregulation allowed banks to enter new local markets by buying banks or branches, but it did
not spur banks to consolidate within markets.  Banks could do that all along in most states.
Figure 8 illustrates the trend in banking concentration starting in 1975.  We measure
concentration with the Herfindahl-Hirschmann Index (HHI) based on deposits.  The HHI equals
the sum of squared market shares (times 10,000), where shares are based on branch-level deposit
data from the Federal Deposit Insurance Corporation’s Summary of Deposits.  We define
‘market’ either locally (Metropolitan Statistical Area) or at the state level.  As the figure shows,
while the number of banks falls off sharply, local concentration remains flat or even falls. 
Concentration measured over states rises only slightly during the 1980s and 1990s.
23  Thus, the
net effects of these structural changes has been fewer but larger and better diversified banks
operating across more local market with more branches.
[Insert Figure 8 here]
These broad trends suggest but do not demonstrate definitively that deregulation altered
the structure of banking markets; concurrent macroeconomic and/or technological factors could
explain these changes to some degree.  Most of the deregulation during the 1980s and 1990s26
occurred through state-level actions.  Because this deregulation occurred at different times in
different states, we can study how both within-state branching and interstate banking affected
banking structure, as well as the real economy, after controlling for time trends.  To explore
systematically how these reforms affected banking and the economy, we report a set of
regressions using the following unified framework:
yst = "t + $s + (
1Within-state branch deregulationst 
+ (
2Interstate-banking deregulationst + ,st ,( 1 )
where s indexes states; t indexes time; yst is a set of dependent variables (measures of banking
market structure and economic performance); "t is a year-specific fixed effect (estimated by
including year indicator variables); $s is a state-specific fixed effect (estimated by including state
indicator variables); Within-state branch deregulationst is an indicator set to one after a state
permits a bank or bank holding company to buy branches throughout the state; and, Interstate-
banking deregulationst is an indicator set to one after a state permits banks from other states to
enter that state.
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Due to the cross-state and over-time variation in the regulatory status of different states,
both unobserved state differences and aggregate shocks (and any trends) can be fully absorbed
with the inclusion of state and year fixed effects, while leaving sufficient variation in the
regulatory variables to estimate their effects on state-level structural and economic performance
variables (yst).  Moreover, by using the state rather than the firm as the relevant unit of
observation, the resulting panel data set is balanced because states do not enter or exit the
sample.  Thus, there is no need to worry about (or attempt to correct for) survivorship biases that
can plague attempts to draw inferences from bank-level or firm-level data.
25  The coefficients on
the deregulation indicators reflect state-specific changes in the dependent variable following
deregulation.
As we describe below, aggregate trends in technology affected all financial services firms
and created increasingly strong pressures for regulatory regime change; interest-group factors27
within financial services can account for differences in the timing of  state-level deregulation. 
Hence, a cross-sectional comparison of banking structure or state growth performance might be
misleading, or at least difficult to interpret.  For example, consider comparing states in a single
year, say 1987.  If states permitting interstate banking had more large banks than states that did
not yet permit interstate banking in 1987, it could be that regulation led to structural changes
favoring large banks (i.e., regulation caused the structural change).  Or it could be that states
with more large banks deregulated before states with fewer large banks (i.e., regulation was
caused by the cross-state differences in structure).
The estimators reported here are not likely to be affected by the political economy
factors.  By including the state fixed effects ($s) in the model, all of the cross-sectional variation
(such as when a state deregulates) gets removed; coefficients are driven by changes in variables
after a state alters its regulations.  Persistent differences across states (e.g., those dominated by
large vs. small banks) do not affect the results.  Moreover, there is no evidence that changes in
bank structure or economic conditions lead (or predict) deregulation, as might occur if states
deregulated to try to jump-start a stalled economy by improving credit supply.  Instead, all of the
changes occur after reform.
26
Panel A of Table 3 documents how the structure of states’ banking systems change
following removal of restrictions on geographic expansion using the regression framework in
equation (1).  The regressions use data for 48 states plus the District of Columbia between 1976
and 1994, the period of rapid state-level regulatory change.
27  In column 1, the dependent
variable equals the degree to which banking within a state is integrated with bank operations in
other states.  The extent of integration is defined as the share of the state’s banks that are owned
by a banking organization that also owns banking assets in other states.  The results suggest that,
on average, 17 percent of a state’s banking assets become integrated with banks in other states
after interstate banking deregulation.  This increase is both statistically and economically large,
equal to about 50 percent of the overall mean level of integration in the sample.  Hence, state28
banking systems become better diversified following interstate deregulation as ownership ties
between banks operating in many states become established.  
[Insert Panel A of Table 3 here]
While integration, and therefore bank diversification, increases, the second column of
Table 3 shows that local market concentration does not increase following deregulation; if
anything, there is a slight drop following interstate banking reform, consistent with the trend
toward lower local-market concentration (Figure 8).  The third column of Table 3 shows that the
market share of small banks declines, particularly after within-state branching reform.  The share
of assets held by banks with under $100 million (1994 $s) in assets falls by 3.1 percentage points
after branching is permitted and about 1.2 percentage points after interstate banking reform. 
Together, these two state-level regulatory changes account for about half of the trend decline in
small-bank share between 1976 and 1994.  So, the trends in bank structure can be accounted for
in large part from removal of regulatory constraints on bank expansion. 
B.2 Bank Risk
As noted above, geographic deregulation in the 1980s led to larger and better diversified
banks.  Theoretically, it is ambiguous whether the increase in competition that led to the
diversification benefits of branch banking would be offset by costs of greater risk taking as
monopoly rents in banking are competed away.  Keeley (1990) and Hellman and Stiglitz (2000)
emphasize that risk-taking incentives from deposit insurance are mitigated by access to
monopoly rents fostered by regulatory barriers to aggressive competition.  Thus, bank stability
during the period between 1940 and 1970 may be explained by the absence of competition in the
face of pricing restrictions and restrictions on branching and interstate banking.  Keeley (1990)
and Demsetz, Saidenberg and Strahan (1997) show that high stock market valuation of banks
relative to book values (‘franchise value’) is associated banks holding lower risk loans and more
capital.
Removal of restrictions on bank underwriting activities also has the potential to enhance29
bank diversification.  Whether such diversification leads to less risk depends on how bank
operating and financial policies adapt to the deregulation.  Demsetz and Strahan (1996) find, for
example, that large banks, while better diversified, are no less risky than small banks because
they tend to hold riskier loans and less capital.  Given this fact, it is perhaps not surprising that
the evidence on the effects of cross-sector expansion of banks into securities and underwriting is
mixed.
28
Deposit insurance also of course played a role in shaping the risk of banking.  Deposit
insurance creates incentive for banks to maximize asset risk and minimize capital because bank
shareholders capture all upside gains but do not face the full costs of bank risks (Peltzman, 1970;
Merton, 1978).  As noted, the U.S. banking system was stable throughout the first 35 years after
federal deposit insurance, and much of that stability occurred because banks enjoyed limited
competition.  With limits on both price competition and entry, banks had access to high profits
and thus low failure rates.  Moreover, the incentive to take advantage of deposit insurance by
increasing asset risk and reducing capital were offset by monopoly rents.  During the 1980s,
however, increased competition both within the financial industry and from the development of
securities markets reduced profitability in banking and came with dramatically increased
failures. 
  The experiences of the Savings and Loan (S&L) industry in particular indicate that badly
structured deposit insurance can encourage excessive risk taking.  Kroszner and Strahan (1996)
show, for example, that S&Ls that converted from mutual to stock ownership grew faster,
expanded their holdings of risky assets (e.g. junk bonds), and disgorged cash in the form of
dividend payments.  In fact, there were even instances of insolvent S&Ls paying dividends. 
Thus, those firms that explicitly altered their ownership form to be able to profit from deposit
insurance tended to increase risk most dramatically to exploit the government subsidy.  More
broadly, Kane (1989) emphasizes the failure of regulators to close institutions despite the costs
to the deposit insurance regime, thus increasing the problem of excessive risk taking.30
On balance, U.S. banking was stable from the initiation of deposit insurance in the 1930s
until the early 1980s.  This stability occurred despite the latent incentive toward high risk
strategies embedded in government-subsidized deposit insurance, in part because regulatory
barriers to competition fostered high rents in the industry.  This protection allowed inefficient
institutions to dominate, thus harming bank customers facing higher cost and lower quality than
they would  under a more competitive regime.  The landscaped began to change in the 1970s and
80s as small and inefficient banks lost capital in the face of macro instability and high interest
rates.  With less wealth on the line, these generally small banks lost both the ability and incentive
to battle larger banks in the political arena.  At the same time, large banks, which historically
favored unrestricted expansion, began to use new technologies such as ATMs to compete in new
markets (even without explicit deregulation).  These changes tipped to political balance toward
advocates of regulatory openness (see Kroszner and Strahan 1999 and 2001a, and section IV
below).  With deposit insurance still firmly in place but access to rents rapidly diminishing (for
both technological and regulatory reasons), many banks and thrifts ‘gambled for resurrection’ by
raising insured deposits and investing the proceeds in high-return but high-risk strategies.  The
result was the high rate of failures at both banks and savings institutions during the 1980s.
B.3 Efficiency & Pricing
Do regulatory changes lead to meaningful improvements in the efficiency of banks,
reductions in costs, and reductions in the price of bank services?  As noted above, interest rate
regulation - maximum lending and deposit rates - had effects on prices during periods when
market interest rates made these constraints binding.  For deposit markets, the effects were
relatively homogeneous because there are limited differences in risk due to government
guarantees.  Banks facing binding Regulation Q interest rate ceilings did face disintermediation,
which became acute in the 1970s both because market rates soared and because non-bank
financial firms began to offer close substitutes for checkable deposits.  Banks attempted to
compete for funds by providing higher quality service (more branches), and by offering gifts and31
other inducements for deposit, thereby dissipating much of the potential rents generated by the
absence of price competition. Usury limits on loan interest rates also restricted credit supply
overall, but probably  restricted credit most among high-risk borrowers.  As noted above, the
Marquette decision, which effectively undermined states’ ability to limit credit card interest
rates, was followed by a steady increase in bankruptcy as higher risk households gained access to
unsecured credit.
Removal of restrictions on geographic expansion also came with better efficiency and
pricing.  Jayaratne and Strahan (1998) and Black and Strahan (2001) report that non-interest
costs, wages, and loan losses all fell following branching reform.  These cost reductions led, in
turn, to lower prices on loans (although not on deposits).  The mechanism for this better
performance seems to be changes in the market shares of banks following deregulation (Stiroh
and Strahan, 2003).  Prior to regulatory reform, well-run banks faced binding constraints on the
markets in which they could operate.  When these constraints were lifted, however, assets were
reallocated toward the better-run banks as they gained the opportunity to acquire market share.
29
Figure 9 shows the consequences of these healthy competitive dynamics by plotting the
market share of banks with above-median profits for states that have permitted branching since
the 1930s or before (12 states) compared with the unit banking states that did not permit any
form of branching (16 states).  The figure illustrates the detrimental effects of these constraining
regulations.  For example, in 1980, before deregulation, the higher-profit banks held slightly
under 50 percent the banking assets in the average unit-banking state; in contrast, the higher-
profit banks held about 70 percent of assets in states where banks were never constrained by
branching restrictions.  This difference disappears completely by 1994.  By then the unit banking
states had permitted within-state branching, thus allowing the better-run banks to dominate the
industry.
30
[Insert Figure 9 here]
B.4  Expansion of Activities and Potential for Conflicts of Interest32
A separate category of research examines the production advantages of financial
conglomeration across business lines.  Once again, there are many studies of efficiency and
profitability within banking, securities, and insurance, but research on advantages of cross-sector
consolidation is limited.
31  Existing research concentrates on bank underwriting of corporate debt
and equity securities, and emphasizes information scope economies in the joint production of
commercial lending and underwriting.  Through their lending activities, banks may gain more
knowledge about a firm’s prospects than other market participants.  This informational
advantage can be a double-edged sword.  On the positive side, banks may be able to identify
firms with good opportunities earlier and at lower cost than other financial institutions.  On the
negative side, a commercial bank might use its superior information to its own advantage, for
example, not revealing potential problems and issuing securities to the public that are riskier than
the market believes (see Kroszner 1998 for a summary)
The empirical research suggests that banks are not succumbing to conflicts of interest and
abusing their information to mislead the market.  Indeed, research on commercial bank
underwriting prior to Glass-Steagall (Kroszner and Rajan, 1994, 1997 and Ang and Richardson,
1994, and Puri 1994, 1996) suggests that debt securities underwritten by banks had a better
default record than those underwritten by investment banks.  Kroszner and Rajan (1997) show
that throughout the 1920s, commercial banks increasingly underwrote their securities through
separately incorporated and capitalized affiliates rather than through internal departments of the
commercial bank itself.  Otherwise similar securities received higher prices (lower risk premia)
when underwritten by a commercial bank affiliate than those underwritten directly by the bank,
suggesting that the “firewall” structure enhanced the credibility of the underwriting bank.  In
particular, the greater the proportion of independent directors on the affiliate’s board, the greater
was the reduction in the risk premium on the securities underwritten by the affiliate.  Thus, the
increasing use of the affiliates could at least in part be explained by commercial banks adapting
their organizational structure to address public concerns about the potential for conflicts of33
interest.
After the repeal of Glass-Steagall with the Financial Modernization Act of 1999,
underwriter fees are lower for bank-underwritten debt securities relative to similar securities
issued by stand-alone investment banks (Sufi, 2005).  Drucker and Puri (2005) find that evidence
that banks bundling lending and equity underwriting services reduce costs to customers. 
Schenone (2005) finds lower underpricing during initial public offerings at firms which have
established a lending relationship with a commercial bank capable of underwriting the IPO,
consistent with the idea that informed banks can certify the value of securities.  Gande, Puri,
Saunders, and Walter (1997) argue that banks’ unique information advantage with respect to
firms with lower credit ratings results in relatively higher prices (lower yields) on underwritten
debt securities for these types of firms. Yasuda (2004) reaches the same conclusion; she finds
that client-specific relationship capital is a unique bank advantage in underwriting when banks
have strong prior lending relationships with the issuing company.
Another potential source of conflicts occurs when commercial bankers serve as board
members of client firms, or when executives of client firms serve on the boards of their banks. 
Kroszner and Strahan (2001b) and (2001c) investigate the frequency of connections between
banks and non-financial firms through board linkages, and examine whether those connections
affect lending.  We document that banks are heavily involved in the corporate governance
network through frequent board linkages.  Banks tend to have larger boards with a higher
proportion of outside directors than non-financial firms, and bank officer-directors tend to have
more external board directorships than executives of non-financial firms.  We then show that
low-information cost firms – large firms with a high proportion of tangible assets and relatively
stable stock returns -- are most likely to have board connections to banks.  These same low-
information cost firms are also more likely to borrow from their connected bank, and when they
do so the terms of the loan appear similar to loans to unconnected firms.   In contrast to this last
finding, Guner, Malmendier, and Tate (forthcoming) do find evidence that firms with financial34
experts on board appear to have better access to financial resources, although this increase is
concentrated among large and relatively unconstrained firms.
Given the lack of data, it is not surprising that there is little research on either bank
production advantages in insurance or on the joint production of insurance and securities
services in the United States.  Lown, et al (2000) argue that Europe provides a convenient model
for how the U.S. financial system could be affected by GLBA because most European countries
permit financial conglomerates.  They show that banks have become increasingly involved in
insurance activities and argue that economies of scope in market and distributing both banking
and insurance products through the branch network can explain their success.  In fact, about 10
percent of all financial M&A activity in Europe occurred between banks and life insurance
companies over the past 15 years.
B.5 Growth & Entrepreneuship
Did the beneficial changes in banking have quantitatively important effects on the real
economy?  Schumpeter (1969) argued in the early part of the 20
th Century that efficient financial
systems promote innovations; hence, better finance leads to faster growth.  Robinson (1952)
countered that the causality was reversed; economies with good growth prospects develop
institutions to provide the funds necessary to support those good prospects.  In other words, the
economy leads and finance follows.  Recent theoretical developments have fleshed out two
potential causal links from  financial systems to growth, even in the long run.  Financial markets
can matter either by affecting the volume of savings available to finance investment or by
increasing the productivity (or quality) of that investment.  These theories show that an
improvement in financial market efficiency can act as a lubricant to the engine of economic
growth, allowing that engine to run faster.
Empirical research has increasingly provided support for the Schumpterian view that
financial market development can play an important causal role in driving long-run growth.  For
example, King and Levine (1993) demonstrated that the size and depth of an economy's financial35
system is positively correlated with its future growth in per-capita real income.  
While this evidence is appealing, it can not rule out the possibility that financial
development and growth are simultaneously driven by a common factor not controlled in the
empirical analysis.  Rajan and Zingales (1998) and Cetorelli and Gambera (2001) attempt to
answer this criticism by exploiting cross-industry differences in financial dependence.  They
show that in countries with well developed financial markets, industries that require more
external finance grow faster than “cash cow” industries that can finance investment with
internally generated funds.
32  Kroszner, Laeven, and Klingebiel (forthcoming) examine the
impact of bank crises on cross-industry differences in financial dependence.  Consistent with an
important “credit channel” role of banking, they find that bank crises have disproportionately
negative impact on financially dependent firms in countries with well-developed financial
systems:  in such systems, the financially dependent firms grow faster in normal times but are hit
harder in crisis times.  Levine, Loayza, and Beck (2000) attempt to establish a causal link from
finance to growth by using preexisting legal differences across countries as instruments for the
development of the banking system; they show that the exogenous component of banking
development is positively related to growth performance.
33
Another way to establish that better finance (or, specifically, better banking) can lead to
faster growth is to find policy changes that lead to more efficient finance (banking) and see how
the economy responds.
34  Bekaert, Harvey, and Lundblad (2003) do this for equity market
liberalization across countries and find that economic growth sped up after reform.  Jayaratne
and Strahan (1996) study state-level branching deregulation and find that this improvement in
banking market openness spurred faster economic growth.
35  Using data from 1972 to 1992, they
estimate the change in economic performance before and after deregulation and found that
annual growth rates accelerated by 1/2 to 1 percentage point.  In that study, they worked hard to
rule out other interpretations of the finding.  For example, they showed that states did not
deregulate their economies in anticipation of future good growth prospects.  They also found no36
other concomitant policy changes that could account for the result and no consistent political
changes, such as a change in the party controlling the state government, around the time of
deregulation. 
In Panel B of Table 3, we re-estimate a growth model similar to the one in Jayaratne and
Strahan using a slightly different sample period (1976 to 1994).  The table reports the results of
the growth regressions based on overall state-level employment.  The result (column 4) suggests
that average per-capita income growth accelerated following both branching and interstate
banking reform.
36  
[Insert Panel B of Table 3 here]
If more competitive banking really spurs growth, we would expect particularly large
benefits among relatively bank dependent sectors of the economy, such as small firms or
entrepreneurs.  To test this idea, the Panel B of Table 3 reports how growth in new business
incorporations - a measure of firm entry and thus entrepreneurial activity - changes following
banking reform (column 5).
37  We find that the growth of entrepreneurial activity increased
significantly following banking deregulation.  Annual growth of new incorporations per capita
increased by 3.2 percentage points after branching deregulation, while the coefficient on
interstate banking deregulation is not statistically significant.  Thus, the effects of geographic
banking reform on entrepreneurial activity are substantially larger than their effects on overall
growth of employment.  This makes sense because bank credit is most important in financing
small businesses without access to public securities markets, and suggest that the reason why
growth accelerates after geographic deregulation is that credit supply to the entrepreneurial
sector expands.
38
B.6 Stability and Business Cycles
The evidence so far points to substantial benefits of opening up banking markets to
potential entry and greater competition through deregulation.  Entrepreneurs are able to start
businesses and, perhaps through their efforts, economic growth accelerates.  Cross-country37
evidence is beginning to emerge suggesting that opening up financial markets to foreign entry
can also create benefits associated with macroeconomic stability (Barth, Caprio, and Levine,
2002).  As noted above, however, there is also evidence from studies at the bank level that risk-
taking may increase with the reductions in franchise value that come following banking
deregulation.
Morgan, Rime and Strahan (2004) test how state-level volatility changed as the U.S.
banking system integrated across state lines following interstate banking reform.  The expected
effect of banking integration on business cycles, however, is theoretically ambiguous.  Shocks to
the the value of local collateral can actually become more destabilizing after integration because,
for example, multi-state banks can move capital elsewhere.  In contrast, local shocks to the
banking system itself become much less destabilizing when banks operate across many markets. 
Overall, Morgan et al find that economic volatility declines with interstate banking deregulation
but not with instate branching reform.
39 
The last column of Table 3 reports the bottom-line finding in Morgan et al.  In this
regression, the dependent variable equals the absolute value of the employment growth residual
from the model reported in column 4.  The dependent variable thus measures the magnitude of
each state’s business cycle shock.  These shocks become smaller on average after interstate
banking reform and the associated integration of the banking system.
40  The coefficient suggests
that the average shock size falls by 0.8 percentage points, relative to an unconditional mean
shock size of 1.0 percentage points.  In other words, prior to deregulation and banking
integration, the typical state’s deviation from expected growth is about 1.4 percentage points,
while after deregulation the typical deviation falls to about 0.6 percentage points.
The theoretical analysis in Morgan et al suggests better macroeconomic stability
following deregulation because state economies become insulated from shocks to their own
banks.  In a disintegrated banking system, such as the one we had in the 1970s and early 1980s,
shocks to bank capital lead to reductions in lending, thereby worsening downturns.  In contrast,38
with integration a state can import bank capital from abroad (i.e., from other states) when its
banks are down, thus continuing to fund positive NPV projects.  If this explanation really holds,
then the correlation between local measures of economic performance or loan availability with
the financial capital of local banks ought to weaken with deregulation and integration.
We put this notion to the test by regressing state-level loan growth and employment
growth on the growth rate of total bank capital in the state, along with interactions between bank
capital growth and the deregulation indicator variables.  The structure of the model follows:
Growthst = "t + $s + (
1Within-state Branch Deregulationst +
(
2Interstate Banking Deregulationst + (
3CapitalGrowthst +  (2)
(
4(Within-state Branching Deregulationst * CapitalGrowthst )+ 
(
5(Interstate Banking Deregulationst * CapitalGrowthst) + ,st .
If interstate banking insulates the economy from local shocks to bank capital, we would expect
(
5 < 0.  We also include an interaction between state-level capital growth and branching reform,
although branching only permits integration within states, so there is less reason to expect this
interaction effect ((
4) to be economically and statistically significantly.
41  
The results reported in Table 4 suggest that interstate banking deregulation reduces the
link between local lending and local bank performance.
42  According to the estimated
coefficients, prior to banking deregulation there is nearly a one-to-one correspondence between
state-level loan growth and capital growth (i.e. the coefficient on capital growth equals 0.83).  In
contrast, this link falls by about 40 percent after interstate deregulation.  Similarly, the
correlation between local employment growth and local bank capital growth weakens, although
less dramatically than the effects on loan growth.  Integration thus has salutary effects on
business cycles by insulating the local economy from the ups and downs of its local banking
system (and vice versa).
[Insert Table 4 here]39
IV.  Deregulation: Why so Long in Coming?
As we have explained, the early part of the 20
th Century was characterized by financial
deepening, particularly in the 1920s.  This process came to a halt with the Depression and much
regulation of banking and securities markets passed during the first half of the 1930s.  Markets
adapted to regulatory constraints, but the beneficial changes following deregulation suggest that
restrictions on competition in particular reduced the quality and availability of financial
resources and hampered economic performance.   Given the costs of these regulations, why was
deregulation so long in coming?
A. The Politics of Deregulation
As we described in Section II, understanding interest group competition can be helpful in
understanding the development of some Depression-era regulations, and it can be helpful in
understanding more recent deregulation.  In two earlier papers, we offer systematic evidence
consistent with the importance of interest group politics in shaping regulatory change (Kroszner
and Strahan, 1999 and 2001a).  We use information in the timing of state deregulation of
branching as well as Congressional voting patterns on several legislative amendments to allow
nationwide branching and to limit deposit insurance coverage.  The first study shows that
measures of interest-group, public-interest, and political-institutional factors can explain the
timing of state-level branching deregulation during the last 30 years (Kroszner and Strahan,
1999).
In particular, we employ a hazard model technique to estimate how cross-state
differences in these factors influence the timing of deregulation relative to the average.
43  Private
interest factors receive both economically and statistically significant support in the data.  As the
share of small banks in the state increases, for example, branching deregulation is delayed.  In
particular, a one standard deviation increase in the small bank share results in a 30 percent
increase in the time until deregulation, or about 4.7 years.  (The average time until branching
deregulation from 1970 is 16 years.) This result is consistent with an intra-industry rivalry40
hypothesis of small banks preferring branching restrictions and large banks preferring
deregulation. 
Inter-industry competition also helps explain the timing of deregulation.  In states where
banks can sell insurance, a relatively large insurance sector is associated with an increase in the
expected time to deregulation.  A one standard deviation increase in the relative size of the
insurance sector in those states which permit banks to sell insurance leads to a 22 percent
increase in the time until deregulation, or about 3.5 years.  This result is difficult to explain on
purely public interest grounds.
Deregulation also occurs earlier in states where small, bank-dependent firms are
relatively numerous.  A one standard deviation increase in the share of small firms reduces the
time until deregulation by 18 percent, or about three years.  This result concerning the interests
of users of banking services is consistent with both the private and public interest theories.
Finally, the partisan structure of the state government also influences when states
deregulate.  As expected, a higher proportion of Democrats in the government tends to delay
deregulation.  A one standard deviation rise in the share of the government controlled by
Democrats slows the deregulation by about two years.  Whether the state is dominated by one
party, however, does not appear to affect the timing of the deregulation.
Private interests thus appear to play an important role in the deregulatory process. 
Although private interests and public interests do sometimes coincide, the results on the relative
share of small banks and large banks and on the relative size of insurance where banks compete
are consistent with a private interest approach but are difficult to explain on public interest
grounds.
To check the plausibility of the results, we also consider whether the ex post
consequences of deregulation are consistent with the ex ante positions attributed to each interest
group (see Kroszner and Strahan 1998 for details).  Small banks lose market share following
deregulation and, in states where banks can enter the insurance business, the insurance sector41
shrinks relative to the banking sector following deregulation.  Borrowers also benefit because the
average interest rates on loans tends to fall following branching deregulation.  These findings
support the private interest interpretation of the results described above: groups that will benefit
push to speed deregulation and those that will be harmed push to delay it.
Do the forces driving intrastate branching deregulation also drive interstate deregulation
at the federal level?  Financial services interests are active contributors and lobbyists.   Their
political action committees constitute the largest group of contributors to legislators, providing
nearly 20 percent of total congressional campaign contributions (Makinson 1992), and much of
their lobbying effort involves competition among rival interests within financial services (see
Kroszner and Stratmann 1998, 2000, and 2005). 
After virtually all states adopted intra- and inter-state branching deregulation, the 1994
Riegle-Neal Act repealed the 1927 McFadden Act to phase out all barriers to interstate banking
and branching by 1997.  The key votes concerning the Riegle-Neal Act were either voice votes
or extremely lopsided, so it is not possible to estimate a voting model for them.  A number of
bills and amendments related to interstate branching had been debated in Congress during the
years prior to the passage of the Riegle-Neal Act, but a search of the weekly BNA Banking
Reporter and the Congressional Record produced only one roll-call vote related to interstate
branching that was not lopsided.  This vote occurred in the House of Representatives on
November 14, 1991 on an amendment sponsored by Wylie (R-OH) and Neal (D-NC) to
introduce interstate banking and branching deregulation to a financial services reform package.
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Although the amendment passed by 210 to 208, the bill to which it was attached subsequently
was defeated.
To check for the impact of the factors that were found to be influential in the state-level
reforms, we also consider both the sponsorship of interstate banking legislation and voting on the
amendment.  The sponsors of the Wylie-Neal amendment are from states with low small bank
shares -- 0.04 in Ohio (Wylie) and 0.02 in North Carolina (Neal).  In contrast, the sample mean42
in 1991 is 0.08 (median=0.07).  Michigan, home state of the Senate’s sponsor of the 1994
Riegle-Neal Act, also had relatively low small bank strength (small bank share of 0.05).
Consistent with the state-level deregulation process, the second study uses a probit model
to analyze voting patterns shows that legislators are more likely to support the amendment if
their states have a relatively low share of small banks (see Kroszner and Strahan 2000).  As in
the analysis of the timing of intrastate deregulation, the fraction of small banks is the most
important interest group influence on a legislator’s voting decision.  The impact of rival interests
outside of banking is also consistent with intrastate deregulation results.  Where banks can sell
insurance, legislators from states with larger insurance sectors relative to banking are less likely
to vote in favor of interstate branching.  Overall, the analysis of the vote on federal branching
deregulation provides a consistency check that the importance of interests operating on the state
legislatures are very similar to those operating at the federal level.
B.  Why did deregulation take so long?
An important question remains to understand the broad timing of deregulation:  Why
begin in the 1980s rather than the 1950s or some earlier period?  The market for financial
regulation, like all regulation, involves competition among groups with competing interests with
significant campaign contributions at both the state and national levels (see Makinson 1992,
Kroszner and Stratmann 1998, 2000, and 2005, and Kroszner 2000).  Financial services interests,
for example, rarely comprise a unified block, with much of their lobbying effort involving
competition among themselves.  The beneficiaries were able to support an equilibrium coalition
in favor of geographical restrictions from the 1930s through the early 1980s despite their costs to
(unorganized) consumers of financial services long after the value of them to governments as a
key source of revenue had faded.
While political economists have often had success in identifying the group that receives
concentrated benefits of a particular regulation in order to explain the persistence of that
regulation, deregulation has been more difficult to explain.  Many factors affect the highly43
complex process of regulatory change.  Nonetheless, to understand the broad timing of
deregulation, it can be helpful to try to identify technological, legal, and economic shocks that
would alter the old equilibrium.  We now consider some fo these shocks in detail to see whether
they can help explain why regulatory change occurred when it did.
Beginning in the 1970s, three major innovations reduced the value to the protected banks
of local geographic monopolies by increasing the elasticity of depositors’ funds.  First, the
invention of the automatic teller machine (ATM) helped to erode the geographic ties between
customers and banks.  After some legal challenges, an ATM networks were determined not to
constitute branches, thereby permitting ATM networks to spread throughout the United States
and the world.  Table 5 shows the rapid proliferations of ATMs, which did not exist before 1970. 
Second, consumer-oriented money market mutual funds also originated in the 1970s (see Nocera
1994).  Checkable money market mutual funds and the Merrill Lynch Cash Management
Account demonstrated that banking by mail and telephone provided a convenient alternative to
local banks.
45  From zero in 1970, Table 5 shows that money market mutual funds are roughly
one third the size of deposits held at banks.  Third, technological innovation and deregulation
have reduced transportation and communication costs, particularly since the 1970s.  Customers
thus now have lower costs of using banks located farther away from them than in the past
(Petersen and Rajan, 2002).
[Insert Table 5 here]
Since the increasing elasticity of deposits supplied to banks reduces the value of
geographical restrictions to their traditional beneficiaries, we argue that these beneficiaries had
less incentive to fight strenuously to maintain them.  While any deregulation that eliminates
inefficient regulation is broadly consistent with the public interest theory, the timing of the
deregulation is difficult to explain by that approach.  The deregulation occurs precisely when the
branching restrictions are becoming less burdensome for the public, due to the elasticity-
increasing innovations discussed above (see Peltzman 1976).  If deregulation were motivated by44
public interest concerns, the lifting of branching restrictions would have happened much earlier
when depositors were more dependent on local banks for both asset management and payments
services. 
On the lending side, increasing sophistication of credit-scoring techniques, following
innovations in information processing technology, financial theory, and the development of large
credit data bases, have begun to change the relationship-character of bank lending towards less
personal and more standardized evaluation.  As a result of these innovations, a national market
developed for residential mortgages in the late 1970s.  In the 1980s, consumer lending relied
increasingly on automated information processing, leading to the development of credit card
securitization.  In recent years even banks’ lending to small businesses has become increasingly
automated, relying on standardized credit scoring programs rather than the judgement of loan
officers.
Technological change thus has diminished the value of specialized local knowledge that
long-established local bankers might have about the risks of borrowers in the community.  Such
changes have increased the feasibility and potential profitability for large banks to enter what
had traditionally been the core of small bank activities.  The large banks have therefore had an
incentive to increase their lobbying pressure to attain the freedom to expand into these markets. 
In addition, as the value of a local banking relationship declined, small firms (borrowers) also
would be more likely to favor the entry of large banks into local markets. These factors
combined to start undermining the economic performance of the small banks that had benefitted
most from the geographic restrictions.  Table 5 shows the relative decline in small banks’ market
share even prior to the branching deregulation that begins in the early 1970s.
One can also point to ‘exogenous’ forces outside the development of new technologies in
the financial sector.  For example, Kane (1996) argues that a major shock to the old equilibrium
is an increase in the public’s awareness of the costliness of having government-insured but
(geographically) undiversified financial institutions.  In the late 1970s the failure rate of banks45
begins to rise (recall Figure 2).  In the 1980s, the Savings and Loan crisis and taxpayer bail-out
further heighten the awareness by the public of the costs of restrictions that make depository
institutions more fragile and more likely to require infusions of taxpayer funds.  The failures thus
may have heightened public awareness of and support for branching deregulation.  For example,
West Virginia's state legislature passed a bill lifting most branching restrictions to help an ailing
economy.  The legislature's actions were "...inspired by the state's need for industrial expansion
and a greater job base.  West Virginia leads the nation in unemployment" (American Banker,
04/17/84). 
Consistent with Kane’s argument, economic conditions also played a part in relaxing
restrictions on interstate banking.  The Garn St Germain Act of 1982 amended the Bank Holding
Company Act by permitting the acquisition of failed thrifts and banks by out-of-state banks or
holding companies.  Banks and thrifts failed by the hundreds in some states in the early 1980s
after the recessions of 1980 and 1981-82 and the “third world debt” crises.  Surviving institutions
in hard-hit states were often not fit to re-capitalize the failed ones, so Congress acted to let in
healthy banks from out-of-state.
46  Some states then allowed out-of-state banks to buy their
banks, but typically these moves were done on a reciprocal basis.  For example, when Maine
first allowed entry by out-of-state BHCs, the law stipulated that banks from Maine must be
allowed to enter those states.  Over time state reciprocal agreements to allow interstate banking
grew, and the transition to full interstate banking was completed with passage of the Reigle-Neal
Interstate Banking and Branching Efficiency Act of 1994.  Reigle-Neal made interstate banking
a bank right, rather than state right; banks or holding companies could now enter another state
without permission.  This act also permits banks to operate branches across state lines for the
first time, allowing multi-bank holding companies to consolidate their operations.
V.  Conclusions
Banking regulations have been changing dramatically during the last three decades. 46
Recent reforms, which removed many of the constraints binding on the banking industry since
the 1930s or before, have re-shaped the financial industry and, in turn, the economy. 
Technological change and financial innovation have played an important role in driving many of
these regulatory changes.  As we have argued, although the financial industry evolved to
mitigate the costs of these regulations during the 1940s through the 1970s, their removal during
recent years has led to a more efficient and competitive financial system, which in turn has
helped improve economic performance and stability.
Looking ahead, we can point to several forces that will shape regulatory change.  First,
the interests of small banks are likely to continue to be active concerning regulations aimed at
maintaining a competitive balance with large institutions, although the activities of the small-
and medium-sized banks are increasingly diverging from those of the large banks.  On the credit-
production side, large banks have increasingly focused on providing capital-market services to
large firms, such as securities underwriting, and have moved aggressively to compete with the
bond market in providing funds through the syndicated lending market.  The large scale required
to achieve sufficient diversification in originating and holding pieces of syndicated loans may in
part be motivating some of the mergers of large institutions observed in recent years (Ivashina,
2006).  Given this consolidation and the focus of large banks on the corporate sector, there may
be a continuing role for small- and medium- sized banks to play in financing small- and medium-
sized businesses.
Second, the gradual implementation of the Basel II Capital Accord may alter bank risk-
management and capital-adequacy policies.  During the 1990s, innovations such as securitization
and the development of the credit derivatives market enhanced banks’ ability to transfer credit
risk to other institutions (Lopez, 2005).  Securitization in the mortgage market has been spurred
by the growth of the GSEs, which have recently begun to face pressure to shrink their mortgage
holdings to reduce concentration of interest rate risk in the financial system.  While such
shrinkage will likely enhance financial-system stability, the GSEs can and likely will continue to47
foster access to low-cost funds for mortgage originators by buying whole mortgages and selling
them off as mortgage-backed securities.  
Outside of the mortgage markets, much of the incentive to transfer risks for banks has
stemmed from poorly designed capital regulations under the original Basel Accord.  In fact,
pressure leading to Basel II came in part from efforts to correct deficiencies in the original
Accord that distorted bank’s incentive to move risks off the balance sheet.  Banks will
presumably thus face weaker incentives to transfer risks just to reduce required capital going
forward with the implementation of Basel II.  On the other hand, the revised Accord explicitly
encourages banks to develop more market-based risk management tools, which could increase
the demand for mechanisms to transfer and trade risks.
Third, the potential conflicts that emerge in large and complex financial conglomerates
remain an important driver of regulatory change and adaptation.  Concern about conflicts
motivated much of the corporate governance reform experienced in the non-financial sector
following the scandals of the early part of this decade.  Within financial services, current law
continues to prohibit banks from owning and controlling non-financial companies, yet several
large non-financial firms have set up Industry Loan Corporations (ILCs) that give them access to
insured deposits.  These ILCs have recently grown quite large and may lead to calls for re-
regulation that will lessen the potential expansion of the deposit insurance safety net beyond the
banking system.  Concerns about potential for conflicts, expansion of the safety net, and
maintaining a competitive and efficient banking system will play key roles in debates over future
regulatory change.48
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MSA as Market State as Market Number of BanksFigure 9: Market Share of High-
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Unit banking states States always permitting branchingTABLE 1: EVOLUTION OF BANKING REGULATIONS





th Century: States and Comptroller of the Currency
limit access to bank charters & restrict branching.
1927: McFadden Act permits states to restrict
branching of national banks.
1956: Bank Holding Company Act give states
authority to restrict entry by out-of-state banks and
holding companies.
1970s-80s: States gradually relax restrictions on in-state branching and cross-state
ownership; OCC and states relax chartering restrictions.
1982: Garn St Germain Act permits banks to purchase failing banks or thrifts
across state lines.
1994: Interstate Banking and Branching Efficiency Act permits banks and holding
companies to purchase banks across state lines and permits national banks to




th Century: Some states introduce mutual-
guarantee deposit insurance systems.
1933: Federal deposit insurance adopted (“temporary”
then permanent in 1934)
1950-1980: Deposit insurance limit periodically
raised, reaching $100,000 in 1980.
1987: Competitive Equality in Banking Act allocates $10.8 billion to recapitalize
the FSLIC.
1989: Financial Institutions Reform, Recovery and Enforcement Act adds
additional funds to deposit insurance and restricts activities of thrifts.
1991: FDIC Improvement Act imposes risk-based deposit insurance and requires
‘prompt corrective action’ of poorly capitalized depository institutions.
2006: Federal Deposit Insurance Reform Act merges bank and thrift funds, allows




1933: Glass-Steagall Act separates commercial
lending and underwriting.
1956: Bank Holding Company Act prevents holding
companies from owning insurance or securities
affiliates.
1987: Federal Reserve allows banks to underwrite corporate debt and equity.
1989-1996: Federal Reserve relaxes revenue restrictions on bank securities
affiliates.





th Century and earlier: State usury laws limit
interest on loans.
1933: Banking Act of 1933 (Glass-Steagall) limits
interest on deposits (Regulation Q).
1978: Marquette decision allows banks to lend anywhere under the usury laws of
the bank’s home state.
1980: Depository Institutions Deregulation and Monetary Control Act (DIDMCA)
phases out interest rate ceilings on deposits.
1980s: Credit card business flocks to South Dakota and Delaware to take advantage




th Century and earlier: State and national banks
required to invest a minimum amount of equity to
attain a bank charter.
1980s: Minimum capital-asset ratios required for banks.
1988 (effective 1992): Basel Accord mandates minimum ratio of capital to risk-
weighted assets, which accounts crudely for differences in credit risk across loans
and for bank off-balance sheet exposures.
1996: Market risk amendment to the Basel Accord introduces model-based capital
requirement for trading positions.
2005 (with phased implementation to begin by 2008): Consensus between
international regulators achieved on Basel II Accord, which moves toward a
comprehensive risk-based capital adequacy standard incorporating market, credit
and operational risk and encourages bank to use internal models to measure risk,
but still subject to revision.TABLE 2
PERCENTAGE SHARES OF ASSETS OF FINANCIAL INSTITUTIONS IN THE UNITED STATES
(1860-2004)
1860 1880 1900 1912 1922 1929 1939 1948 1960 1970 1980 1993 2004
Commercial banks 71.4 60.6 62.9 64.5 63.3 53.7 51.2 55.9 38.2 37.9 34.8 25.4 24.4
Thrift institutions 17.8 22.8 18.2 14.8 13.9 14.0 13.6 12.3 19.7 20.4 21.4 9.4 6.7
Insurance
companies 10.7 13.9 13.8 16.6 16.7 18.6 27.2 24.3 23.8 18.9 16.1 17.4 15.2
Investment
companies -- -- -- -- 0.0 2.4 1.9 1.3 2.9 3.5 3.6 14.9 21.7
Pension funds -- -- 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.7 2.1 3.1 9.7 13.0 17.4 24.4 21.7
Finance companies -- 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 2.0 2.2 2.0 4.6 4.8 5.1 4.7 4.2
Securities brokers
and dealers 0.0 0.0 3.8 3.0 5.3 8.1 1.5 1.0 1.1 1.2 1.1 3.3 5.3




investment trusts -- -- -- -- -- -- -- -- 0.0 0.3 0.1 0.1 0.7
Total
(percent) 100 100 100 100 100 100 100 100 100 100 100 100 100
Total
(trillion dollars) .001 .005 .016 .034 .075 .123 .129 .281 .596 1.33 4.0 13.9 34.9
a Data not available.
Sources: Data for 1860-1948 (except 1922) from Goldsmith (1969, Table D-33, pp. 548-9); data for 1922 from Goldsmith (1958, Table 10, pp. 73-4); and data for
1960-1993 from Board of Governors of the Federal Reserve System, "Flow of funds accounts," various years.  The table is expanded from Kaufman and Mote
(1994).  Assets held by government-sponsored enterprises and asset-backed securities issuers are not included.TABLE 3
PANEL REGRESSION OF BANK STRUCTURAL AND ECONOMIC PERFORMANCE ON DEREGULATION INDICATORS
(Standard errors in parentheses)
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All models include both year and state fixed effects.  The local deposit HHI is the sum of squared market shares for all banking organizations operating within a
local market, defined as an MSA.  For states with multiple MSAs, we average the HHI across MSAs within the state, weighted by the amount of deposits in the
MSA.  The model is estimated using a fixed effects model with both year and state effects. These regressions are estimated using a fixed-effects model with both
year and state effects.  Sample includes 49 states (DC included, South Dakota and Delaware dropped) and 19 years (1976-1994).  ***, **, and * denote statistical
significance at the 1, 5 and 10 percent levels, respectively.  Standard errors are constructed assuming that residual is clustered across states.TABLE 4
PANEL REGRESSION OF STATE-LEVEL REAL LOAN GROWTH ON BANKING DEREGULATION INDICATORS AND BANK CAPITAL
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These regressions are estimated using a fixed-effects model with both year and state effects.  Sample includes 49 states (DC included, South Dakota and
Delaware dropped) and 19 years (1977-1994).  .  ***, **, and * denote statistical significance at the 1, 5 and 10 percent levels, respectively.  Standard errors are
constructed assuming that residual is clustered across states.TABLE 5

















1950 0 $154 $0 100 NA
1955 0 191 0 100 NA
1960 0 228 0 100 24
1965 0 330 0 100 20
1970 0 479 0 100 18
1975 9,750 775 4 99 18
1980 18,500 1,182 76 94 17
1985 61,117 1,787 242 88 14
1990 80,156 2,339 493 83 11
1995 122,706 2,552 530 82 8
2000 273,000 3,146 1134 74 4
Column 1: ATM figures are from Bank Network News, The EFT Network Data Book (New York:
Faulkner and Gray, Inc.). The 1975 figure was unavailable.  9,750 is the number of ATMs in 1978, the
first year for which complete data are available.  Columns 2-4: Banks domestic deposits are from the
Reports of Income and Condition;  money market mutual funds are from the Flow of Funds. Data on all
bank deposits, foreign plus domestic are only available beginning in 1970.  The trend in banks' share
(column 4) is the same using total deposits instead of domestic deposits.  Column 5: Percent of banking
assets held by small banks, where a small bank is defined as a commercial bank less than $100 million in
assets in 1994 dollars. These data are based on the Reports of Income and Condition.  Data on small
banks are not available before 1960.1.Another important and growing area of regulation are fair lending laws that attempt to expand
credit to low-income areas and to reduce lending discrimination (e.g. The Community
Reinvestment Act and the Home Mortgage Disclosure Act).  We are not going to discuss these
laws because this dimension of banking regulation, while very important, has not had major
effects on the structure of the banking industry.  For a comprehensive review of these laws, see
Thomas (1993).
2. There is a large literature debating the merits of “free banking” in the US and elsewhere.  See,
for example, Rockoff (1975), Rolnick and Weber (1982), White (1984), Selgin (1988), Cowen
and Kroszner (1989),  Kroszner (1997), Dowd (1992), and Bodenhorn (2003).
3. See, for example, Calomiris and Kahn (1996), Calomiris (1998), Kroszner (1998, 1999 and
2000).
4.  Noll (1989) has characterized conceiving of governments as distinct interest groups
concerned about financing their expenditures as the Leviathan Approach; see Buchanan and
Tullock (1962), Niskanen (1971), and Brennan and Buchanan (1977).
5. Until the early 1990s, for example, the Illinois Banking Commission would grant "home
office protection" which prohibited a bank from opening a branch within a certain number of
feet of another bank's main office.
6. Hubbard, Palia, and Economides (1996) examine the political-economy of the passage of the
McFadden Act and find results consistent with a triumph of the numerous small and poorly
capitalized banks over the large and well-capitalized banks.  See also White (1983) and Abrams
and Settle (1993).
7. Dehejia and Lleras-Muney (forthcoming) analyze the political economy of deposit insurance
adoption from 1900 to 1940.  After controlling for the endogeneity of the deposit insurance
regime, they provide evidence of a negative relationship between the adoption of deposit
insurance and growth, suggesting that such regimes may have impaired the efficiency of the
banking system and capital allocation in these states.
8. Much has been written about the S&L crisis of the 1980s, and we will not review that very
large literature here.  See, for example, Kane (1989), Kroszner and Strahan (1996), White
Endnotes(1989).
9. Stock prices of those banks listed in the Wall Street Journal as ‘too big to fail’ rose on hearing
the Comptroller’s unwillingness to close them (O’Hara and Shaw, 1990).
10. Mitchener (forthcoming) analyzes different state regulatory regimes during the Great
Depression and finds that states allowing supervisors to liquidate troubled banks quickly had less
bank instability than other states.
11. See http://www.ibaa.org/advocacy/.
12. On the political economy of the origins of Glass-Steagall, see Macey (1984) and Shughart
(1988).
13. See Kroszner and Stratmann (1998, 2000) and Stratmann (2001) on the politics behind
legislation aimed at removing restrictions on Glass-Steagall.
14. See http://www.loanpricing.com/.
15.  The "junk bonds" of the 1980s often had equity-like characteristics so it is possible to
interpret the turning toward equity and away from debt in the late 1920s as a form of this type of
financing. 
16. As Boyd and Gertler (1994) and Kaufman and Mote (1994) note, a reduction in the share of
assets of all financial institutions itself does not address the broader issue of whether the banking
industry is in decline.
17.  One significant factor today that was not operative in the 1920s is the Basle Bank Capital
Accord, which provides an incentive for banks to hold relatively more (government) securities
than loans on their books.  Unlike the early period, during the late 1980s and early 1990s, the
increase in securities holdings was primarily in terms of government rather than corporate issues. 
By raising and risk-adjusting the minimum capital requirements and giving government
securities a zero "risk weight," the Basle Accord has given banks a strong incentive to increase
their holdings of government securities.
18.  Recent tightening of the personal bankruptcy code has occurred in part to reduce personal
banktruptcy rates.
19.  Kaufman and Mote (1994) note that ignoring the trust services of banks, as the table does,
may significantly understate the actual overall share of commercial banks.20. Jensen (1989) has argued that these alternatives arose directly in response to restrictions like
Glass-Steagall.  Also note that this now broadens the definition of universal banking to include
ownership and active monitoring roles by the banks rather than simply corporate securities
dealing and underwriting.
21. In addition, in 1978 the tax rate on capital gains was reduced from 49.5 percent to 28 percent,
thereby making VC more attractive for taxable investors also.
22. Policymakers have voiced concerns about the resulting expansion of interest rate risk at the
GSEs (Greenspan, 2004).  Passmore, Sherlund and Burgess (2005) argue that most (but not all)
of the benefits of GSE-subsidized borrowing benefits their shareholders rather than mortgage
borrowers.  Loutskina (2005) and Loutskina and Strahan (2005) show, however, that
securitization fostered by GSE activities helps banks manage their liquidity risk and reduces the
impact of financial constraints on bank-loan supply. 
23. Concentration at the national level, however, has increased substantially.
24. Most states first permitted banks and bank holding companies to branch through mergers or
acquisitions of existing banks or bank branches, and later allowed banks to open new branches
throughout the state.
25. These issues are especially important for studies of entry regulations because the competitive
shakeout that occurs after regulatory change increases the odds that some banks will not survive. 
Nevertheless, firm-level studies of banking efficiency generally suggest that during the 1990s,
the consolidation in banking led to larger and more efficient organizations.  For a review of this
literature, see Berger, Demsetz and Strahan (1999).
26. For detailed evidence on the timing of the effects of regulatory changes, see Jayaratne and
Strahan (1996), Kroszner and Strahan (1999) and Morgan, Rime and Strahan (2004).
27. We drop the states of South Dakota and Delaware because the entry of credit card banks into
these two state makes their historical evolution during the 1980s unique.
28 Kwast (1989) examines banks’ balance sheets and compares returns on trading account and
non-trading account assets.  He finds only limited potential diversification benefits from
securities underwriting by banks.  Boyd and Graham (1988) and Boyd, Graham, and Hewitt
(1993) use a combination of merger simulations and portfolio weighting to find that bankinvolvement in life and property/casualty insurance could, ceteris paribus, reduce the risk of
bank failure.  Involvement in securities or real estate, however, would likely increase the risk of
failure.  Lown, Strahan and Sufi (2000) simulate mergers between financial companies over a
more recent time period and find a potential reduction in the risk of failure as a result of
hypothetical mergers between life insurance firms and BHCs.  Kwan (1998) finds that BHC
securities activity is associated with greater risk, but provides potential diversification benefits
due to the low correlation between returns on banking and securities activities.  For a review, see
Kwan and Laderman (1999).
29. Hubbard and Palia (1995) also show that management compensation became more sensitive
to performance after deregulation.
30. Sorting banks in a given regulatory regime by profits is designed to separate well-run from
poorly run banks.  To the extent that regulations generate rents, all banks in a given regime may
tend to have high profits.  What matters for this comparison is the relative ranking across banks. 
A similar result can be seen by sorting banks on cost-based measures of performance. 
31 Studies that examine efficiency gains for within-sector consolidation include Berger (1998), Hughes,
Lang, Mester, and Moon (1999); Goldberg, Hanweck, Keenan and Young (1991); Berger, Cummins,
Weiss and Zi (1999).
32. Cetorelli (2001, 2003) attempts to gain a better understanding of the channels through which
better finance can affect economic performance.  He shows that countries with concentrated
banking sectors tend to have more concentrated industrial sectors, particularly in those sectors
where external finance is important.  On the other hand, Bonaorrsi di Patti and Dell-ariccia
(2001) find that banking concentration in Italy helps foster creation of new firms.
33. Bertrand, Schoar, and Thesmar (2007) find important improvements in allocative efficiency
across firms in France following deregulation of French banking that began in the mid-1980s.
34. For a comprehensive review, see Levine (2003).
35. More recently, Collender and Shaffer (2003) explore how other aspects of banking structure
affect economic growth.
36. Jayaratne and Strahan (1996) also show that gross state product grows faster after branching
reform.  Moreover, they are careful to rule out the possibility that the growth increases weredriven by just a few states; that growth accelerated because reform occurred during business
cycle troughs or around banking crises (note that this is not the case following interstate banking
reform, making it harder to draw causal inferences from this result); and that growth accelerated
because other policies changed at the same time as banking reform. 
37. We use new business incorporations as a measure of entrepreneurial activity in each state,
again from 1976 to 1996, because it offers the best proxy available that is compiled on a
consistent basis over a relatively long period. Black and Strahan (2002) provide evidence that
this measure is a reliable indicator of business formations.
38. Consistent with a greater rate of creation of new firms, Cetorelli and Strahan (2006) also find
that the number and share of small firms increases with measures of banking market competition,
especially in sectors dependent on external finance.
39.  In addition, Gatev and Strahan (2006) and Gatev, Schuermann and Strahan (2006) show
how banks help provide liquidity during periods of market pullbacks such as the one following
the Russian default during the Fall of 1998, thereby helping stabilize the financial system.
40. Morgan et al measure banking integration in more detail - for example by taking account of
transition following interstate reform - and find larger and more robust declines in volatility than
those reported here.
41. In contrast, branching may weaken the link between local banking resources and lending at
the city or county level.  This channel merits further research.
42. Local banks here means banks headquartered within the state.
43.  We estimate a Weibull hazard function with time varying covariates.  The same results
obtain in simple ordinary least squares regressions.  We also control for a variety of other factors
that might affect the likelihood of deregulation, such as, the frequency and size of bank failures
in the state and regional clustering of deregulation.
44. The Wylie-Neal amendment also included provisions limiting certain insurance and real
estate powers of national banks (Congressional Record, November 14, 1991, pp. 10239-42).
45. Regulation Q, which limited the interest rates that banks could pay on deposits, may have
helped to drive depositors away from banks when the gap between market rates and deposit
ceilings grew during the 1970s.46.  While some states did relax restrictions on bank expansion in response to macroeconomic
downturns, there is no correlation between rates of bank failures or the state-level business cycle
conditions and the timing of branching reform (see Jayaratne and Strahan, 1996; Kroszner and
Strahan, 1999).  Similarly, Morgan et al (2004) show that the timing of interstate banking
deregulation can not account for the decline in state-level economic volatility that follows
reform.